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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 






Appearances: Cynthia G. Kasnia, Esq. 
· 316 Main Street 
Suite 8 
Poughkeepsie, New York 12601 
DecisiM apn:l"· e.Q.: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Smith, Crangle, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived February 6, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview T~anscript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
J Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals l!nit, wri~en 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the App'~als Unit's Findings and the separ te -pndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on £_1/0//~ tf6 . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. 
Appellant is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to Life 
after having been convicted by verdict of two counts of Murder 2nd, Robbery 1st, and Criminal 
Possession of a Weapon 2nd.  Appellant, in concert with others, entered into a supermarket, bound 
several individuals, stole currency, and Appellant shot and killed another individual in the head 
causing his death. 
 Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and placed too much emphasis on the very serious nature of the multiple crimes of 
conviction; (2) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to Appellant’s “submissions” to the 
Board, accomplishments, programming, low COMPAS scores and remorse; (3) the Board failed 
to provide Appellant with guidance as to how to improve his chances of parole release; (4) the 
Board’s decision lacked sufficient detail; (5) a parole recommendation letter may not have been 
sent to the defense attorney; (6) certain issues were not discussed during the interview; (7) the 
Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process rights; and (8) the Board’s 
decision was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant.  
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
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parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
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Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
As to the third issue, the Board is not required to state what an inmate should do to improve 
his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 
1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 
N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 
2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
As to the fourth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 As to the fifth issue, rather than speculate as to the existence of a parole recommendation 
solicitation letter mailed to the defense attorney, Appellant and Appellant’s attorney could have 
submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) for a copy of the letter.  In any 
event, a letter soliciting a parole recommendation was sent by the Department to Appellant’s 
defense attorney. 
 As to the sixth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
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As to the seventh issue, , the Supreme Court has held that because a person's liberty interest 
is extinguished upon conviction, there is no inherent right, or right under the U.S. Constitution, to 
parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).  Likewise, there is no due process right to parole under the 
New York State Constitution. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Matter of Russo, 
50 N.Y.2d 69; Matter of Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 
2005). Thus, the protections of the due process clause do not apply to the Parole Board’s 
determinations as to whether an inmate should be released to parole supervision. Maldonado v. 
Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183163 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Barrow v. Vanburen, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 181466 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001).  We recognize, 
however, that while an inmate has no vested right to parole release under the due process clause, 
there is a liberty interest which requires, as a matter of procedural due process, an opportunity to 
be heard, and a statement of the reasons for the denial of release.  Therefore, in deciding whether 
to grant or deny parole, all the Board must do is: (1) afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard, 
and (2) if parole is denied, provide the reasons for the denial. Thurman v. Allard, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18904 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Blackett v. Thomas, 293 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gittens 
v. Thomas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Appellant received both of these 
constitutional protections and, therefore, any arguments alleging that the Board’s decision was 
made in violation of the due process clause, and in contravention of a liberty interest arising from 
the due process clause, are without merit. 
As to the eighth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray 
v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
